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STATUTORY REDEMPTION IN COLORADO
FREDERIC P. STORKE* and DON W. SEARS*"
of the Boulder Bar
Editor's note: This article represents one chapter from a book now being
completed by the authors and to be published in the near future.

The statutory right of redemption is to be sharply distinguished from the equity of redemption. The latter is destroyed
by the foreclosure sale, 26 which gives the purchaser an interest
in the property free of this equitable right. The Colorado Redemption Act 27 gives certain rights to redeem after the sale. The
equitable and statutory rights never run concurrently, the latter
becoming effective at the instant when the former ceases to exist.
The statute provides for redemption by three classes of persons:28 (1) owners; (2) persons liable on a deficiency; and (3)
lienors. The manner of redemption by each class and its legal
effect is stated in the act. A period of six months, running from
the date of the foreclosure sale, is set up. 29 We will call this "the
standard redemption period." The owner of the property at the
time of the redemption may redeem within this standard period.
No order of redemption is specified during this time, so that either
the owner or other persons liable may redeem without waiting
for the other.
Lienors, whose liens are subsequent to the foreclosed mortgage, may redeem after the expiration of the standard period. 0
In order to have this right, a lienor must take two steps during
the standard period. He must record his lien (unless it is already
of record), and he must file a notice of intent to redeem with the
officer making the sale (usually the Public Trustee or Sheriff).31
If no notices are filed, the rights to redeem of all parties terminate
at the end of the standard period, and the purchaser is entitled
to a deed.
If one or more lienors, having recorded liens, duly file notices,
they have a right to redeem according to their priority.3 2 The
"senior" lienor, that is, the one whose lien ranks next after the
foreclosed mortgage, is given a ten day period immediately following the close of the standard redemption period, in which he may
redeem. Each subsequent lienor has five days in the order of
priority.
*Professor, University of Colorado School of Law.
**Associate Professor, University of Colorado School of Law.
"' Fisk v. Cathcart, 3 Colo. App. 374, 33 Pac. 1004 (1893).
2'COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 40, Art. 4 (1935).
'AId. § 158.
29Ibid.

Id. § 159.
= Ibid. The annotation to this section erroneously states that the lien must
be of record and the notice filed thirty days before the expiration of the sixmonth period. This statement is based on an article by Ira Quiat, VI DICTA 18
(1929), written while the bill was pending. Apparently the thirty-day provision
was omitted from the act as finally passed.
2COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 40, § 159 (1935).
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The existence of the statutory right of redemption makes it
necessary for the purchaser at the foreclosure sale to check carefully before he receives his deed. A prematurely issued deed
is void, and there are difficulties in correcting such a mistake. The
purchaser must first inquire of the Public Trustee or Sheriff
whether any notices of intent to redeem have been filed. If there
are none, he calculates six months from the sale and adds one
day, which gives him the earliest date at which a deed may be
issued. If notices of intent have been filed, he multiplies the number of such notices by five, adds five days to this, plus the six
months standard period, finally adding one more day to the total.
The operation of the Redemption Act is strictly limited to
real estate security transactions. 33 There is no provision in our
statutes for redemption after a foreclosure sale of personal property. The Act applies to sales "by virtue of any mortgage, trust
deed or other lien" and also to execution sales. Whether there is
a right to redeem after a foreclosure sale under an executory land
contract depends on the interpretation of the word "lien". The
Colorado courts have described the security interest of the seller
in a land contract as a "vendor's lien".
METHOD OF REDEMPTION

We have seen that a person exercising the equitable right to
redeem must pay the full amount of the mortgage debt. This is
not true of redemption under the statute. The person redeeming
(unless there has been a previous redemption) need pay only the
amount for which the property is sold, plus interest and certain
other charges.3 4 This is a vitally important feature of the whole
scheme, as will be shown in detail later. It is customary to say
the person redeeming must pay the "amount of the certificate."
This refers to the certificate of purchase executed by the officer
conducting the sale, which states the amount for which the property was sold. 35 Payment of the amount required to redeem is
made to such officer, who then issues a certificate of redemption 3
to the person entitled thereto. This certificate must be recorded.
If there is no further redemption, the holder of the certificate will
be entitled to a deed.
It will be noted that the owner and a party redeeming because of a deficiency liability are treated alike both as to the time
within which they may redeem and the method and amount paid.
The first lienor to redeem, although he does so within a different
period, pays the same amount and follows the same method of
payment. The effect of redemption by these different persons is
not at all the same. This will be discussed in detail later.
Successive redemptions are possible whenever one lienor has
redeemed and other lienors, junior to him, have filed notices of
Id. § 158.
Ibid.

Id.
Id.

§
§

168.
160.
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intent to redeem.3 7 In this case, the second redemptioner does
not merely pay the amount of the certificate, with interest and
charges. He must add the full amount of the lien of the person
from whom he redeems. If this were not the case, the first redemptioner would lose all claim to the property and merely get
back what he had paid to redeem, a clearly unjust result.38 The
net effect would be to give the property to the last redemptioner
instead of to the first, thus destroying the senior lienor's priority.
Let us now consider a hypothetical case involving typical successive redemptions, which we will call Illustration I. D mortgaged property to C1 and C2 successively for $10,000 and $5,000
respectively, both mortgages being duly recorded. C. and C4 recovered judgments for $1,000 and $500 respectively, in that order,
and filed transcripts thereof. The first mortgage was foreclosed
and at the sale held February 15, 1952, C, bid in the property for
$6,000 and received a Sheriff's certificate of purchase, which he
recorded. D made no attempt to redeem, C2 , C. and C, all filed
notices of intent to redeem with the Sheriff during the standard
redemption period which expired August 15, 1952. On August
16th, C 2 redeemed by paying $6,000 to the Sheriff, who issued the
certificate of redemption to C2 (in all illustrations, amounts paid
for interest and other charges are omitted for the sake of simplicity; the reader must bear in mind that in an actual case these
amounts must be added). C3 wished to redeem immediately, but
was advised by his lawyer that he could not do so until August
26th. The redemption period fixed for C3 begins on August 26th
and ends on August 30th, and is not accelerated by the fact that
C2 redeemed early in his own period.3 9 Accordingly, C redeemed
on August 26th by paying $11,000 to the Sheriff, being the amount
paid by C 2 plus the amount of C 2 's own, lien. On September 4th,

the last day of his own redemption period, C4 redeemed by paying $12,000 to the Sheriff. This is the amount paid by C, plus
the amount of C 3 's lien. On September 5th, C 4 demanded a deed

to the premises. Since all periods of redemption had now expired,
the Sheriff delivered the deed to C4. The latter now holds title
to the land free and clear of the claim of D, C 1, C2, and C 3. It

should be noted that C4 has paid twice as much for the land as
C, bid at the foreclosure sale. He would not have paid this amount
if he did not feel that the land was worth'more than $12,000.
It will be observed that C1 made a mistake by bidding only
$6,000 when the property was worth $12,000 and his own claim
was for $19,000. In consequence of the redemption, he has so far
Id. § 159.
This unfair result was actually produced by the statute as originally
passed. Colo. Laws 1929, c. 151, § 2, permitted the second redemptioner to
'

redeem by paying the amount paid by the first redemptioner. This mistake was
discovered and corrected by Colo. Laws 1931, c. 140, § 1, requiring the later
redemptioner to pay the amount of the lien held by the person from whom he
redeemed.
"COLO. STAT. A-.:v., c. 40, § 159 (193'5).
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collected only $6,000. It is true that he can recover a deficiency
judgment against D for the remaining $4,000, but this may prove
to be uncollectible. If he had been foresighted, he would have bid
the full amount of his claim, provided that he felt that the property was worth that much to him. Then the redemption would
have left him with his debt paid in full and if there were no
redemption, he would have property of at least equivalent value.
This brings out one of the basic policies of the Redemption Act.
The very existence of the possibility of redemption brings pressure on the foreclosing
mortgagee to bid the reasonable value of
40
the property.
REVIVAL OF LIENS

When the property is sold in foreclosure, all liens junior to
the foreclosed mortgage are cut off, provided that the holders are
duly joined and served. What happens to these liens in the event
of redemption following the sale? There is a widespread doctrine
that at least some of these liens revive as a result of the redemption. There is a very plausible argument for this result. The
redemption statutes in most states provide that redemption shall
annul the sale. 41 Since it is the sale which destroys the liens, it
quite naturally follows that annulment of the sale will restore
the liens. Many of the cases rely on this simple doctrinal interpretation without consideration of the soundness of the result
reached by holding that the liens revive.
Revival of liens has been called "a trap for the unwary." 42_
Suppose that Illustration I occurred in a state where all liens rerived on redemption. It would be quite unwise for D to redeem.
While he could get his property back on payment of $6,000, the
lien of the foreclosed mortgage would revive as security for the
balance of $4,000. The mortgagee could foreclose all over again to
collect this balance. As we shall see later, the present Colorado
statute prevents this result.
Revival of liens must not be confused with the accrual of a
lien de novo. 43 Suppose Illustration I occurred in a state where
the lien of the foreclosed mortgage did not revive on redemption.
The mortgagee could secure a deficiency judgment and file a transcript, thus securing a new lien on the redeemed land. So far as
D is concerned, he is no better off than if the lien actually revived.
There is an important difference, however, when the owner of
the premises at the time of foreclosure is a non-assuming grantee,
G. In a state where liens revive, the land in the hands of G is
subject to the mortgage. However, the filing of a transcript of
the deficiency judgment against D does not result in a lien against
4Durfee

and Doddridge, Redemption from Foreclosure Sale, 23 MIcH.

L.

REv. 825 (1925) ; Note, 5 U. OF CHI. L. R EV. 624 (1937).
41 See, for example, CoLo. STAT. AN., C. 40, § 72 (1935),
"the said sale and
the certificate thereupon granted shall become null and void."
" Durfee and Doddridge, note 40 supra.
'OsBoRNE

WONMORTGAGES,

§ 309

(1951).
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the land of G. Consequently in a state where liens do not revive.
G gets the property completely free from any claim of C for the
deficiency.
Like most other states having redemption statutes, Colorado
has adopted the doctrine of revival of liens. This is true both
under the present statute, passed in 1929, and predecessor statutes. The decisions under the earlier law were contradictory and
there was an attempt to clarify the law in the 1929 Act. This
lays down specific rules on the subject, in contrast to the older
statutes which merely provided that the sale should be annulled
by redemption, with no mention of revival of liens.
EFFECT OF REDEMPTION BY ORDER

When the owner of mortgaged premises redeems from a foreclosure sale, the result is to annul the sale and leave the premises
subject to all liens except the lien of the foreclosed mortgage, which
is discharged by the sale. 44 In other words, the redeeming owner
gets his property back subject to the junior liens which would
have been cut off if there had been no redemption. In Illustration I, the lien of C1 does not revive as security for the $4,000
still due on his mortgage, but the liens held by C 2, C,,, and C 4 all
revive upon redemption. It does the owner very little good to
redeem unless he is in a position to pay off the junior liens.
Only one case involving the effect of redemption by the owner
under the present law has been found. In Home Owners' Loan
Corporationv. Meyer,45 there was no actual redemption but the
court treated the case as if the owner had redeemed, because of
an estoppel against the foreclosing creditor. The Loan Corporation, C 1 , foreclosed a deed of trust on property owned by Lippis
(D), bid in the land and received a certificate of purchase from
the Public Trustee. Meyer (C 2 ) held a junior judgment, with a
duly recorded transcript, which was cut off by the sale. C 1 decided to give D a further opportunity to pay off the loan. After
expiration of the redemption period, C1 should have applied to
the Public Trustee for a deed, conveyed the property to D, and
taken back a new deed of trust. This would, have completely
eliminated C 2, who had failed to redeem. Instead, C1 assigned his
certificate of purchase to D, who presented it to the Public Trustee
and asked for a certificate of redemption, which was given to him.
Observe that D, as holder of the certificate of purchase, was entitled to a Public Trustee's deed, and if this had been issued all
would have been well. D gave C 1 a new deed of trust, which was
later foreclosed, and C1 once more acquired the property. But C,
now claimed that his junior lien was revived by the "redemption"
again the land now owned by C 1. This position was upheld by
the court. C1 , having acquiesced in the issuance of the certificate
STAT. ANN., C. 40, § 161 (1935).
1 110 Colo. 501, 136 P. 2d 282 (1943); Storke, A Decade of Colorado Law, 23

'COLO.

ROCKY MT. L. REV. 247 (1951).
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of redemption to D, was estopped to claim that there had been
no redemption in fact.
The case is an object lesson in foreclosure procedure. The
foreclosing creditor should follow the method prescribed by the
statute without attempting to invent short-cuts. It is clear that
no one should attempt foreclosure without a thorough study of
the Colorado Redemption Act.
Although the lien of the foreclosing mortgagee is not revived
under the present statute, he may recover a deficiency judgment
and file a transcript. The words of the statute "lien of the foreclosed mortgage, which is discharged by the sale" do not mean
that the mortgage debt is discharged, but merely the lien. Any
other interpretation would do violence to the well established
right to a deficiency judgment. That the foreclosing mortgagee,
on following this procedure, will acquire a lien de novo on the
indicated by the
property of the owner who
46 redeems is clearly
case of Twogood v. Ocsay.
In the Twogood case, C1 , one of several mechanic's lienors
holding liens of equal priority, foreclosed and the other lienors
intervened. The property was purchased by Twogood (P), for
$825. This sum was pro-rated among the lienors whose claims
totalled $2,500. As the owner, Cauley (D), was personally liable
for the debts secured by mechanic's liens, deficiency judgments
were entered against him in favor of the lienors. One of these,
Gratke (C 2 ), filed a transcript of his deficiency judgment and
assigned it to Ocsay (C 2X), who filed a notice of intent to redeem
with the Sheriff and tendered the necessary amount within the
ten-day period following the close of the standard redemption
period. P sued to enjoin this redemption, but the court held for
CX. P argued that the lien of C 2 X was not "subsequent" to the
foreclosed lien of C 1, hence C 2X had no right to redeem. The
court pointed out that C 2X was not redeeming by virtue of the
mechanic's lien, which was discharged by the sale, but by virtue
of the judgment lien, which accrued when the transcript was
filed and was therefore subsequent to the foreclosed lien. During
the redemption period, D still had an interest in the property.
The lien of the deficiency judgment attached to this interest, so
that C 2X was entitled to redeem. The implications of this decision are tremendous, and will be further considered in the discussion of the effect of redemption by lienors. For our present
purpose, the important point is that any person holding a deficiency judgment may acquire a lien de novo by filing the transcript.
EFFECT OF REDEMPTION BECAUSE OF A DEFICIENCY

The clause of the statute just discussed provides for redemption by the "owner", not by the "mortgagor". When the original
mortgagor transfers all his interest, he cannot redeem as "owner".
If he is still personally liable, however, he may redeem by virtue
197 Colo. 300, 48 P. 2d 1119 (1935).
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of the clause in the statute, permitting redemption by "any person
who might be liable upon a deficiency." 41
When D, after mortgaging property to C to secure his own
debt, transfers all his interest to G, G is entitled to redeem as
owner and D as a person liable for the deficiency. If G has assumed
the debt and makes a further transfer to GG, GG can redeem as
owner, D and G as parties subject to a deficiency liability. But
if G did not assume in this last situation, he has no right to
redeem at all. He is not the owner and is not liable for any deficiency.
The clause permitting redemption because of a liability for
a deficiency is not common in redemption statutes. It did not
appear in our legislation before 1929. No case involving the
operation of the clause has come before our Supreme Court. What
is the object of such a provision, and how does it work in practice?
The clause permitting redemption by the owner is based on
a policy of ownership protection, giving the owner an extra six
months to occupy his home and attempt to refinance the loan. The
object of permitting redemption by a person liable on a deficiency
is quite different. It is based on the fact that such a person is
usually a surety for the owner. It forms part of a general policy
of suretyship protection. Its effect is to enlarge a surety's right
of subrogation.
The effect of this type of redemption is to make the person
redeeming "the owner of the lien redeemed from, to the full extent
thereof including all extra costs and expenses paid by such redemptioner, who shall nevertheless be still liable for such deficiency." 41
Notice, it is the lien, not the property, of which the redemptioner
becomes the owner. As the redemption annuls the sale, the owner
is benefited. He is no longer in danger of losing his property at
the expiration of the redemption period. However, his land is
subject to the lien now held by the redemptioner. The latter may
foreclose if this lien remains unpaid.
Let us consider a typical suretyship situation, Illustration II.
D borrows $10,000 from C, giving his note for the debt, which is endorsed by S for D's accommodation. D also gives C a mortgage
as further security. When the debt falls due, and at any time
before a foreclosure sale, S may pay it and will then be subrogated 41 to the note and mortgage. This puts S in the same position as if C had assigned the note and mortgage to S. As between
D and S, the former should have paid the debt. When S paid, he
acquired a right of reimbursement 50 against D, that is, a personal
right of action to recover the amount paid. The right of subrogation gives him a security interest in D's land designed to make
the right of reimbursement more effective.
COLO. STAT. ANN:., c. 40, § 158 (1935).
Id. § 161.
'Watts v. Bock, 80 Colo. 223, 249 Pac. 1095 (1926);
TION, § 162 (1937); OSBORNE ON MORTGAGES, § 278 (1951).
w'Cave v. Belisle, 117 Colo. 180, 184 P. 2d 869 (1947);
§ 104 (1941).
"

RESTATEMENT, RESTITURESTATEMENT. SECU11IT
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S's right to pay the debt would be terminated by the foreclosure sale if it were not for the provisions of the Redemption
Act. The Act gives him an additional six months to exercise this
right, on somewhat modified terms. When C forecloses and bids
in the property for the full amount of his claim, S has no right
to redeem. His liability for the deficiency is at an end. But if C
bids only $8,000 and receives a certificate of purchase, S may
redeem regardless of any actual judgment for the deficiency.
Although S owes C $10,000 plus, he may redeem by paying $8,000
with interest from the date of the certificate. He is still personally liable to C for the balance of $2,000 plus, as expressly
provided in the Act."'
The usual equitable right of subrogation does not arise until
the surety pays the debt in full. The statutory right given by the
Redemption Act requires only the payment of the amount paid
at the sale, plus charges. It is clear that S may foreclose for this
amount, but not for the additional amount of the deficiency, if
he has not actually paid this. If he does pay the deficiency before
foreclosing, may he add this amount to his lien? While the statute
does not make this clear, he should have a right to do so on the
basis of the underlying ideas of subrogation.
Suretyship relationships are not confined to accommodation
loans like the foregoing illustration. They arise out of almost
every transfer of mortgaged property. Particularly, where the
owner of mortgaged property sells it to a grantee who assumes
the mortgage, the grantee becomes the principal debtor and the
grantor-mortgagor a surety. This relationship is definitely recognized by the courts.52 It is based on the fact that the grantee
has received credit for the amount of the mortgage as a deduction from the purchase price, and both parties clearly contemplate
that he should pay the mortgage debt. If he fails to pay it, and
there is a foreclosure and a deficiency, the mortgagor is in the
same position as S was in Illustration II, above. He is a party
liable for the deficiency and has a right to redeem and be subrogated to the mortgage. He also has a personal right of reimbursement against the grantee.
The right of the mortgagor to redeem and be subrogated
exists even if the grantee does not assume, provided that the
amount of the mortgage has been deducted from the purchase
price. In this case the mortgagor has no right of reimbursement,
since the grantee is not personally liable. It may seem strange
that a suretyship relationship should exist here, where only one
person is liable for the debt. The courts have worked out a doctrine that the land is the primary fund for the payment of the
mortgage debt. Sometimes they appear to personify the land as
the principal debtor in order to emphasize that the mortgagor is
a surety. This treatment is necessary to prevent the unfair wind5'COLO.

§ 161 (1935).
supra; RESTATEINENT, SECURITY, § 83(c), comment e (1941).

STAT. A-cN.. C. 40,

":Note 50
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fall which would result to the grantee if he were allowed to keep
the land while the mortgagor paid the debt. The net result is that
the mortgagor is a party entitled to redeem because of his deficiency liability, and becomes the owner of the lien upon redemption.
How does the statute apply when a person liable on a deficiency is in no sense a surety? This possibility will be indicated
in a hypothetical case, Illustration III. D owned property which
he valued at $15,000, and which he mortgaged to C for $10,000.
He sold it to G, who paid him the entire $15,000, relying on D's
promise that he would pay off the $10,000 mortgage when it fell
due. D failed to make this payment, C foreclosed and bid in the
property at the sale for $8,000. D was then a party liable for a
deficiency. He redeemed by paying $8,000 to C, and claimed to
be the owner of the mortgage with the right to foreclose it
against G.
Although a literal application of the statute would seem to
sustain D's position, it is quite certain that the courts would deny
the foreclosure action. Probably G's best defense would be to
counterclaim for $10,000, the loss resulting from the failure of
D to discharge the mortgage debt as he had promised to do. He
should also ask for cancellation of the mortgage. This procedure
enables the court to reach the equitable result without doing violence to the wording of the statute. Conceding that D has become
the owner of the mortgage, he has no right to foreclose it because
nothing is due him thereon after a proper adjustment of the
claims of the parties. Another way to state this result is to say
that D's ownership of the mortgage is based on his right of subrogation and this does not exist because D is not a surety.5 3 He
has merely paid his own debt, for which he is primarily liable by
the terms of his arrangement with G and the payment by the
latter of the full purchase price. G is a "property surety," 54 one
whose land is secondarily liable for the debt of another.
In the foregoing illustration, D expressly promised G to discharge the mortgage. Even if he made no such promise, the result
is exactly the same. G has an equity that D shall pay the mortgage based on G's payment of the full purchase price without
deducting the mortgage debt. The law imposes a duty on D to
discharge the mortgage regardless of any promise.
EFFECT OF REDEMPTION BY LIENOR

One purpose of giving lienors a right to redeem is to make
any surplus value in the mortgaged property available to others
having liens thereon. - Another purpose, not clearly apparent
from the statute itself, is to bring pressure on the foreclosing mortgagee to bid a fair amount for the property. In Illustration I,
above, D bid only $6,000 for property which was worth much
more. If he had realized that he would lose the land because of
OSBOR NE ON MORTGAGES,
RESTATEMFNT, SECURITY,

§ 278 (1951)
§ 83(b), comment c (1941).

Stevenson v. Sebring, 63 Colo. 4, 164 Pac. 308 (1917).

DICTA

Mar., 1953

the redemption by a lienor, he would probably have bid the full
amount of his claim. There seems to be fairly general recognition
of this fact by banks and other institutional lenders, so that it
is quite a standard practice to bid the full amount of the mortgage
debt, when the land is fairly worth that amount.
The statute 6 provides that when redemption is made by a
lienor, his certificate of redemption operates as an assignment to
him of the estate and interest acquired by the purchaser at the
sale, subject however, to the rights of persons who may be entitled
subsequently to redeem. As the purchaser at the sale acquires
the property free and clear of all junior liens, this should be
equally true of the redemptioner. In this provision there is no
statement that the sale is annulled. This indicates that there
will be no revival of liens when a lienor redeems. This is very important, as there was case authority prior to 1929 indicating that
an intermediate lien revived when a subsequent lienor redeemed.5 7
We have seen that when the foreclosing mortgagee becomes
the purchaser at the sale, he may lose the land to a redeeming
lienor while part of the debt remains unpaid. This cannot happen
to a redeeming lienor. The latter either keeps the land permanently, or loses it to another redemptioner with the compensation
of having his own claim paid in full. It is the obvious intent of
the statute that the last redemptioner should keep the land, regardless of whether it is worth the amount spcured by his lien, a fraction of this amount or many times the amount. The court so held
in Bailey v. Erny,55 interpreting a predecessor statute. The purchaser at the foreclosure sale tried to prevent a judgment creditor
of the mortgagee from redeeming by paying him the amount of
his judgment. The court held that he had no such right, and
awarded the land to the redeeming judgment creditor.
The rule of-Bailey v. Erny gave the last redemptioner an absolute right to the land. This rule was severely limited in Plute v.
Schick,59 which held that under certain circumstances the purchaser at the foreclosure could retain the land by paying off the
claim of the lienor desiring to redeem. This is a very unfortunate
decision, 60 which not only contradicts the letter of the statute, but
seriously undermines its basic policy. Permitting junior lienors
to redeem penalizes underbidding by the foreclosing mortgagee.
If he can escape the penalty by paying off the lienor, there is far
less incentive for him to bid a fair amount at the sale. In order
to discourage underbidding, provisions penalizing it should be
strictly enforced even if this occasionally gives the redeeming
lienor an undeserved windfall.
T
CoLo. STAT. ANN., c. 40, § 161 (1935).
"Stryker v. Dunn, 72 Colo. 45, 209 Pac. 644 (1922). But see Harrington v.
Anderson, 87 Colo. 417, 288 Pac. 1049 (1930), reaching a contrary result without
discussion of Stryker v. Dunn.
68 Colo. 211, 189 Pac. 18 (1920).
19101 Colo. 159, 71 P. 2d 802 (1937).
60Case note, 12 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 58 (1939).
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In this case Schick (C 1 ) held two deeds of trust on a house.
one given by Kist (D) and the other by his grantee, Baxter (G).
C 1 foreclosed and bid in the property for $1,244.78. He also procured a quitclaim deed from G, went into possession and made
improvements. Plute (C 2X), discovering a judgment for $52.50
outstanding against the property in favor of Connor (C 2), procured an assignment of this judgment. He filed notice of intent
to redeem on the last day of the standard redemption period, and
within the following ten days tendered the amount necessary to
redeem to the Public Trustee. The Trustee had issued a deed to
C1 on the last day of the standard period. This was clearly premature, even if no notice of intent to redeem had been filed, so
the Trustee withdrew the deed. C 1 now paid the amount due on
the judgment to the clerk of the court in which it had been recovered, claiming this cut off C 2X's right to redeem. C 2X brought
an action to compel the Public Trustee to issue a deed to him,
joining C1 as a defendant. The court denied any relief to C 2X
and indicated that the Public Trustee could properly issue a deed
to C 1.
It is notorious that hard cases make bad law. Courts have
always had trouble in deciding which of two innocent parties
should bear a loss caused by the wrongful conduct of another. In
Plute v. Schick they faced the problem of determining which of
two undeserving parties should get a windfall. They solved it
by taking the property away from the party who would otherwise
get the biggest windfall, and whose conduct seemed to the court
to be most reprehensible. C 2X had borrowed the abstract from
C1 as a prospective purchaser, discovered the outstanding judgment and bought it up in order to get the land for a song. However, C, had violated two of the principles which the statute is
designed to promote. He had bid in the property cheaply at the
sale and should have been penalized for underbidding. He had
taken possession during the redemption period, though the statute
is designed to prevent this. The conditional and inchoate nature
of the interest held under a certificate of purchase is sufficient
warning to the purchaser not to make improvements before he
secures a deed. Such improvements are made at his peril and
should create no equity against redemption. The court purported
to apply the spirit of the statute as against its letter, but completely failed to comprehend its underlying purpose.
FORECLOSING MORTGAGEE AS SUBSEQUENT LIENOR

In Twogood v. Ocsay,6 1 a creditor redeemed by virtue of a
deficiency judgment recovered after the sale. He was not the
foreclosing mortgagee, but apparently the latter would have the
same right. Both of these parties were mechanic's lienors entitled to share equally in the proceeds of the sale. Under an earlier
statute, the courts had decided that a foreclosing mortgagee who
recovered a deficiency could redeem from his own sale as a judgI1Note 46 supra.

DICTA

Mar., 1953

ment creditor,6 2- and Twogood v. Ocsay indicates that the same
result would be reached under the present act.
Assuming this to be true, when would a foreclosing mortgagee wish to redeem and what would he gain by it? We will
consider a hypothetical case, Illustration IV. C 1 held a $10,000
mortgage given by D on land worth $15,000. C 1 foreclosed, and
finding no junior liens of record, decided to bid only $6,000. He
bought the land for this amount and recovered a $4,000 deficiency.
A month later C 2 recovered a $100 judgment against D. He filed
a transcript and notice of intent to redeem. C1 then consulted a
lawyer, who advised him that C2 could take the premises from
him by paying $6,000 plus interest. He suggested that C1 file the
transcript of his deficiency judgment and a notice to redeem.
Then if C 2 redeemed during his ten-day period, C1 could re-redeem
from him by paying $6,100. The practical result is exactly like
Plute v. Schick,63 namely, to enable the foreclosing mortgagee to
keep the land upon paying off C 2's judgment. The procedure in
Illustration IV, however, enables C1 to pay off C2 regardless of
the special equities existing in the Schick case. It can be seen,
therefore, that the Schick and Twogood cases can be used by the
mortgagee to escape the penalties for underbidding.
Our hypothetical mortgagee discovered that the power to
redeem from his own sale gave him an even greater advantage
than the one just discussed. Why wait until someone else recovers
a judgment against the mortgagor when he can file the transcript
as soon as he recovers his deficiency judgment? Then he would
be a lienor subsequent to the foreclosed mortgage but prior to any
judgment creditor who files later. The mortgagee-purchaser can
file his notice of intent to redeem and sit back to see what happens.
If junior liens and notices of intent are filed, he redeems within
the ten-day period and no one can redeem from him for less than
$10,000. If there are no such notices, he does not redeem, keeping the land and the deficiency judgment. Of course if the land
is really worth $15,000 and C 2's judgment is small, C1 would
actually prefer the position of a junior lienor entitled to redeem
from C2 . The danger in waiting is that someone may file a judgment so large that it would not pay C1 to redeem from it. It should
be further noted that the filing of the transcript of the deficiency
judgment is only designed to protect C1 against liens filed subsequently. Liens filed before the sale retain their priority over the
deficiency judgment.
It follows from this discussion that some rather strange results follow from the rule permitting the foreclosing mortgagee
to redeem from his own sale.6 4 It is probably advisable to amend
-Bailey v. Merritt, 90 Colo. 338,
son, 87 Colo. 417, 288 Pac. 1049 (1930)
3, 203' Pac. 666 (1922).
63Note 59 supra.
64 Our courts apparently adopted
nental Trust Co., note 62 sitpra. For
ON MORTGAGES, § 310, note 88 (1951).

9 P. 2d 485 (1932); Harrington v. Ander; Leavitt v. Continental Trust Co., 71 Colo.
the rule from Illinois. Leavitt v. Conticriticism of the Illinois rule see OSBORNE
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the statute to prevent this, and also to repeal the rule of Plute v.
Schick.
MISCELLANEOUS REDEMPTION PROBLEMS

When the last redemptioner keeps the land, what becomes of
the claim which he holds against the mortgagor? The better view
is that the debt is paid to the extent of the value of the land, less
the amount paid to redeem, and this view is accepted in Colorado.6 5
In Illustration I, C 4 paid $12,000 to redeem and his own judgment
was for $500. If the value of the land was $12,300, the judgment
would be reduced to $200.
At a foreclosure sale involving rental property, the court
sometimes orders the sale to include the rents during the redemption period. This was true in The Norman, Inc. v. Holman.66 The
purchaser on foreclosure paid a substantially larger sum for the
privilege of acquiring the rents, and it was this larger sum that
was paid by a redemptioner. The purchaser claimed the right to
retain these rents after the redemption, but the court correctly
ruled that they were part of the estate sold on foreclosure and
passed to the redemptioner.
During the redemption period, the mortgagor continues to be
the "owner" for certain purposes. He has the right of possession7
and his "title" is not divested until the sheriff's deed is deliveredC
Even after the standard redemption period has expired, the mortgagor has an insurable interest and is entitled to the full amount
of the insurance in the event of a loss. 6 8 On the other hand, the
purchaser on foreclosure is considered the "owner" during the
redemption period for purposes of the Mechanic's Lien Law.6 9
Quite likely the mortgagor could also be considered an owner for
this purpose.
The problem of redemption by owners of fractional interests
after foreclosure often arises and is controlled by the principles
previously stated in connection with the equitable right of redemption. The Colorado cases are concerned with the right of a judgment creditor to redeem, when his judgment is against one of
two persons having undivided interests in the land. Redemption
is permitted on payment of the full amount of the certificate. 70 A
curious fact variation is found in Leach v. Torbert.71 A creditor
had recovered a joint judgment against two persons, one of whom
'Bailey

v. Merritt, 90 Colo. 338, 9 P.

2d 485

(1932).

Martin, 29 Minn. 226, 13 N. W. 34 (1882) ; OSBORNE oN
"105

Colo. 294, 97 P. 2d 739

Accord. Sprague v.

MORTGAGES, §

310 (1951).

(1939).

The court found a "constructive" delivery in Bankers' Building Association v. Fleming Lumber Co., 83 Colo. 335, 264 Pac. 1087 (1928), where the Public
Trustee executed the deed and retained it in his possession.
"Farmers' Union Association v. San Luis State Bank, 86 Colo. 293, 281
Pac. 366 (1929). The fire occurred within the three months period for redemption by judgment creditors under the law as it stood at the time.
G COLO. STAT. AN-,N.,

c. 101, Art. 2 (1935).

See case cited note 67 supra.

" Walker v. Wallace, 79 Colo. 380, 246 Pac. 553 (1926); Bailey v. Erny, 68
Colo. 211, 189 Pac. 18 (1920).
171 Colo. 85, 204 Pac. 3'34 (1922).
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owned an undivided half interest in the foreclosed land, the other
having no interest. The judgment creditor attempted to redeem,
but as he had entered a satisfaction of the judgment against the
debtor who owned part of the land, the court correctly held that
this attempt was ineffective.
THE OLDER LEGISLATION

Before 1929 there were various provisions scattered through
the Colorado statutes affecting the right to redeem from foreclosure sales. Most of these were retained in the Colorado Statutes
Annotated (1935) ,72 in spite of the repealer clause to be discussed.
There was a statute giving a right of redemption from execution
sales, 73 and a separate section providing that redemption from
statute
foreclosure sales should be governed thereby.7 4 Another
7 5
controlled redemption from sales by the Public Trustee.
These statutes, like the present one, provided for a standard
redemption period of six months. Judgment creditors of the security debtor could redeem within a three-months period following
the standard period. It was immaterial whether such creditors
held a lien, but only those having an actual judgment had a right
to redeem after the standard period. Junior mortgagees could
redeem within the standard period when the sale was under an
execution or foreclosure. In the case of sales by Public Trustee,
there was a separate provision for encumbrancers to redeem, apparently during the standard period.
Originally there was no provision that judgment creditors
should redeem in the order of their priority, any such creditor
being allowed to redeem any time within the three months. This
created a "race of diligence" since, if a creditor whose judgment
was senior failed to redeem until some junior creditor had done
so, the former could not redeem without paying the junior judgment and so forfeiting his priority.7 6 The effect of "revival of
liens" on this rule will be discussed later. As the statute stood
in 1921, two-day periods were set up in which lienors could redeem
in order of their priority. The method of redemption by judgment
creditors was cumbersome, requiring a second sale by the redeeming creditor after he had paid the redemption money.
The adoption of the present redemption law in 1929 77 was
a great improvement. A single method was made applicable to
mortgage foreclosures, sales on execution and sales by Public
Trustee. The three months period was abolished and judgment
creditors, as well as other lienors, were allotted specific and exclusive periods to redeem. The method of redemption was simSTAT. ANN., C. 40, §§71-78; c. 93, §§ 60-66 (1935).
COLO. Comp. LAWS, §§ 5950-5956 (1921).
Id. § 5078.
'Itd. §§ 5053-5060.
76Paddack v. Staley, 13 Colo. App. 363, 58 Pac. 363 (1899); Stryker v. Dunn,
72 Colo. 45, 209 Pac. 644 (1922)
" Colo. Laws 1929, c. 151.
'CoLo.
73

%
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plified and improved. Under this law the purchaser at the sale
could receive a deed after six months if no notices of intent to
redeem were filed, instead of nine months.
There was a general repealer clause in the new act Is with a
saving clause as to mortgages and deeds of trust executed prior
to the passage of the act.79 In the rare event that a mortgage of
such an ancient vintage should be foreclosed, the purchaser should
take care not to have the deed issued before the end of the nine
months period.so
CASES INTERPRETING THE OLD STATUTES

Of the many decisions discussing the rules governing redemption prior to 1929, many have been rendered obsolete by statutory
changes, while others still have some value as precedents. In the
former category are included cases involving the revival of liens.
The importance and difficulty of this problem justifies a brief
summary of these cases.
Floyd v. Sellers I" laid down a rule that all liens revived when
the security debtor (judgment debtor) redeemed, and that no liens
revived when a judgment creditor redeemed. The first branch of
the rule was qualified in Mihoover v. Walker,8 2- which held that
Junior liens revive but not the lien of the foreclosed mortgage
upon redemption by the owner. This
is the rule now in force by
3
the express terms of the 1929 Act.
The rule denying revival of liens when a judgment creditor
redeems was discussed at length, and apparently approved, in
Paddack v. Staley, 4 and was applied in Jenkins v. Gold Dollar
Mining and Milling Co.8 5 so as to cut out an intervening mortgagee
who had failed to redeem. Then came the important case of
Stryker v. Dunn." This was the first case arising under the statute permitting redemption by subsequent encumbrances from a
Public Trustee's Sale. The court held that redemption by C:,
holder of a third deed of trust, after foreclosure by C 1, revived
the lien of C2 , holder of an intermediate deed of trust, who had
failed to redeem. The older cases, all decided under a different
statute, were not cited.
The last case decided under the old law was Harrington v.
Anderson,8 7 which cannot be reconciled with Stryker v. Dunn.
This also involved a Public Trustee's sale. The foreclosing holder
Ild. § 11.
;'The saving clause provides for redemption under the old law "where the.
method of redemption is part of the contract." The effect of this limitation is
not clear.
"Morris, Foreclosure by Sale by Public Trustee, 28 DICTA 437 (1951).

117 Colo. App. 498, 44 Pac. 373 (1896).
1263 Colo. 22, 164 Pac. 504 (1917)
"'CoLo. STAT. AN-., c. 40, § 161 (1935).
84Note 76 supra.
s 27 Colo. App. 247, 149 Pac. 269 (1915).

s72 Colo. 45, 209 Pac. 644 (1922).
s Colo. 417, 288 Pac. 1049 (1930).
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of the senior trust deed recovered a junior judgment and redeemed from his own sale. This was held to cut out the lien of
an intervening recorded judgment. No mention was made of
Stryker v. Dunn. If any amendments to the statute had a bearing on this change in the law, there is nothing in the opinion to
indicate this.
With the case-law on revival of liens in this confused and
unsatisfactory state, the rule of the 1929 Act comes as a welcome
relief. No liens revive when a lienor redeems: junior liens, but
not the lien of the foreclosed mortgage, revive when the owner
redeems. Admittedly, this is paraphrasing the statute. Only the
effect of redemption by the owner has been passed on by the
courts, s8 and there is a remote possibility that the effect of redemption by a lienor may be interpreted so as to permit revival of liens.
It is devoutly to be hoped that nothing of this sort will occur.
IMPORTANCE OF THE REDEMPTION STATUTE

Actual redemption is a rare phenomenon. No genuine case
of redemption by the owner has come before the Colorado Supreme
Court in thirty years. There are only a handful of cases involving redemption by lienors during this time, and none at all concerning redemption by persons liable on a deficiency. Many lawyers go through years of practice without ever handling a case in
which redemption is attempted. This may easily create the impression that the subject is one of only theoretical interest, to be
studied only when the situation arises directly.
This would be a very shortsighted view. The very existence
of the possibility of redemption is an important factor in every
foreclosure. In the first place, without a thorough knowledge of
the Redemption Act, a lawyer may request the Sheriff or Public
Trustee to issue a deed prematurely. Again, he may find himself
in a procedural bog such as engulfed the Home Owners' Loan Corporation in the Meyer case, 9 resulting in an altogether unintended
redemption. More to the point, however, is the fact that a lawyer
cannot properly advise a foreclosing mortgagee as to the amount
he should bid at the sale, unless he realizes the possible loss which
may result if a redemption should happen to follow. The statute
is designed to exert a mental coercion upon the mortgagee, compelling him to bid a fair price if he is cognizant of the terms of
the statute. Ignorance of them, as the court pointed out in the
Meyer case, will not excuse the mortgagee or relieve him of his
difficulties. The time necessary for a lawyer to acquire a thorough
understanding of the redemption law will be well spent, and will
enable him to give the kind of advice which will prevent mortgagees from making mistakes such as those often appearing in
the reported cases.
Many states have no redemption statutes, and some of these
-Home Owners Loan Corporation v. Meyer, 110 Colo. 501, 136 P. 2d 282
(1943).
Im110 Colo. 501, 136 P. 2d 282 (1943).
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have abandoned them after a thorough trial. The whole idea of
permitting redemption after foreclosure has been severely criticized. It adds to the length of time that must intervene before
the purchaser at the foreclosure sale gets a clear title. This definitely discourages speculative bidding, almost the only kind that
can be expected at foreclosure sales, except for persons seeking
to protect their own interests. It has been pointed out that everything which adds to a lender's expense sooner or later is charged
as a cost to the borrower. 0
In view of these considerations, can the Colorado Redemption
Act be considered a worthwhile piece of legislation? The arguments seem to be fairly evenly balanced. We have had redemption
so long that it seems unlikely that the practice will be abandoned.
On the whole it is not advisable to sacrifice the favorable results
of the redemption law, which produce higher bids by mortgagees
and lower deficiency judgments. The possibility that interest rates
might be lower and mortgage money easier to obtain if there were
no redemption law is too uncertain to justify giving up these
very positive advantages.
Is it possible to improve the method of redemption? Some
question may be raised as to whether liens should be revived when
the owner redeems. This revival has been thought necessary to
protect the junior lienors when redemption by the owner comes
first. It has been suggested that if the period of redemption by
lienors preceded the period for redemption by the owner, there
would be no need for revival of liens."' The Colorado statute might
be improved by reversing the time for redemption by owners and
lienors and shortening the period for the owner to redeem to three
months in order to promote speculative bidding at the foreclosure
sale.
,o Bridewell, The Effects of Defective Mortgage Laws on Home Financing,
5 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 544 (1938).
11Durfee and Doddridge, Redemption from Foreclosure Sale-The Uniform
Act, 23 MIcH. L. REV. 825 (1925).

I WOT THAT LAWYERS WITEN MUCH
I am sure that no attorney would attempt to use any word
with which he was not thoroughly familiar and am therefore
amazed at the profound learning of my brethren at the Bar and
their knowledge of early English words. The verb "wot" has a
very ancient and noble lineage and a well established place in the
English language which today is preserved almost solely by lawyers and such other conveyancers as are allowed by Committees
on Unauthorized Practice to ply their trade. For the enlightenment of less informed laymen the verb "wot" is almost the exact
equivalent of "know." The original form, in the present, was I
wot, thou wottest, he wot or wotteth, we, you and they witen. The
form of "wot" found most frequently is the "to wit" used in most
conveyances in a manner which, but for common usage, would be
of highly questionable syntax.
T. J. O'NEILL.
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THE MASSACHUSETTS RULE IN THE
DENVER COUNTY COURT
DONALD C. McKINLAY
of the Denver Bar

By a recent decision I the County Court of the City and County
of Denver settled a question which has been troubling Colorado
executors and trustees for many years.
The question was this: Were the income beneficiaries of a
residuary trust entitled to all of the net income earned during the
period of administration, or were they entitled only to that portion of such net income which was earned by the "clear residue,"
i.e., by those assets which remained at the end of administration
and which went into the trust?
In the actual case presented to the County Court $15,350.92
of net income was earned by the gross assets of the decedent's
estate during the period of administration. The Executor and
Trustee, by formula, ascertained that of this total amount $3,082.85
was earned by those assets which were sold during administration
to pay claims, taxes and costs of administration. Since these assets
never became a part of the "clear residue" delivered to the Trustee at the close of administration, the Executor and Trustee, following a rule originating in England, determined that the $3,082.85
should become principal and added to the corpus of the testamentary trust.
The life beneficiaries of the trust protested and contended
that all of the net income earned during the period of administration, to-wit, $15,350.92, should remain income and be paid to
them. They relied upon the so-called Massachusetts Rule and
upon the decision of the Colorado Supreme Court in Mulcahy v.
Johnson, 80 Colo. 499, 252 P. 816.
Following a hearing and the filing of briefs, Judge David
Brofman for the Denver County Court held that he would follow
the so-called Massachusetts Rule and thereupon ordered that all
of the net income earned during administration be paid to the
life beneficiaries of the residuary trust. No appeal to a higher
court was made. The Executor-Trustee accepted this decision and
paid the life beneficiaries accordingly.
By her will the testatrix had directed that her entire residuary estate be placed in trust. She then provided:
I direct the Trustee to pay one-half of the net income derived from the trust estate to my daughter .
during her life, and to use one-half of the net income of
the said trust for the proper care and maintenance of
my son . . during his life.
In the Matter of the Estate of Elsie Billingsley Laforgue, Denver County
Court No. 78523, Petition of the Executor and Testamentary Trustee for Instructions, Findings and Order of December 29, 1952.
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The survivor of her son and daughter was to receive the entire
net income of the trust and upon the death of such survivor the
trust was to terminate and the corpus distributed to the testatrix's
.heirs at law.
No attempt will be made to repeat in detail the authorities
cited and the arguments advanced by both sides as a short summary will suffice for most readers.
Both sides acknowledged that there was a definite split of
authority in the United States, and each argued that the rule it
propounded was the "majority rule." 2_, The Executor and Trustee
pointed out that the English Rule had been adopted by the authors
of the Restatement of Trusts in 1935.: The life beneficiaries, on
the other hand, pointed to the "currently very noticeable" trend
since 1935 toward the Massachusetts Rule and predicted that the
authors of the Restatement would amend their position. In several states, notably New York, the courts first adopted the English
Rule, but the legislatures by subsequent statutes established the
Massachusetts Rule.
Mulcahy v. Johnson, supra, was thoroughly discussed as the
facts and decision in that case were closer to the issue before the
Court than any other known Colorado case. For all practical
purposes the trust provisions in Johnson's Will were the same
as those in the subject Laforgue Will. Considerable income was
earned during the period of administration of Johnson's estate
($15,594.60 net). His executors paid all of this income to the
testamentary trustees who treated it as corpus and paid none of
it to the life beneficiaries. The beneficiaries brought an action
against the trustees for an accounting. The trial court denied
the accounting, but on appeal the Supreme Court of Colorado
reversed the decision below and held that the life beneficiaries
were entitled to all of the net income earned during administration. The Court did not state specifically whether this meant the
income earned by the "clear residue" of the estate or whether it
meant all of the income, even that earned by assets used to pay
claims and costs of administration.
One of the questions in the instant case was whether the
English Rule versus the Massachusetts Rule issue had been presented to the Court in the Mulcahy case. The following statement
was found in the Answer Brief of the Johnson trustees:
It seems to be the theory of the plaintiff, based on
the evidence introduced, that the life beneficiaries are
entitled to the whole net earnings made by the executors
"2

'Proponents of English Rule claimed England, the District of Columbia and
eight states: Conn., Del., Ky., Nebr., N. H., N. J.,Ore. and Vir., as following
the English Rule.
2' Proponents of Massachusetts Rule claimed twelve states: Conn., Md.,
Mass., Minn. N. Y., N. C., Ohio, Okla., Pa., R. I., Tenn., and Vir. (Conn., Md.,
N. Y., Pa. and Vir. by statute).
Restatement of Trusts, Section 234, Comment "g."
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out of the testator's entire estate during the twenty
months management from death to discharge. The witness Trant stated (fol. 292) that the whole net income
on the whole estate was $15,594.60, based upon his method
of computation as an accountant, and this is the amount
claimed by plaintiff for all life tenants. Even though the
advisory rule invoked by the plaintiff be held controlling
in tlhis case, it is only the net income from that part of
the whole estate which was put in trust that belongs to
the life beneficiaries. (Emphasis added.)
It would seem that the portion italicized, although not so labeled,
was an argument for the application of the English Rule.
In the Reply Brief of the plaintiff life beneficiaries in the
Mulcahy case is found this statement, which, unless read in the
light of the Supreme Court's ultimate decision, is somewhat ambiguous:
We agree with the statement on Page 20 of the
Brief of Defendants in Error that 'it is only the net
income from that part of the whole estate which was
put in trust that belongs to the life beneficiaries' but
counsel fails to define 'that part of the whole estate which
was put in trust.' We submit that it is all of the estate
of the testator owned by him at the time of his death,
less devises, bequests and corpus charges.
The legacies were paid, the devises distributed, the
charges made, by the executors during the period of administration. The rest of the estate constitutes the trust
res or corpus. This corpus earned money during the period of administration. Certain expenses of earning the
money were deducted and the net income remaining was
$15,594.60.
Unfortunately there are no other details in the Mulcahy v.
Johnson briefs, and one must draw his own conclusions from the
above quotations and from the Court's decision, as to whether
the issue here described was actually considered and decided by
the Colorado Supreme Court in the Mulcahy case. It seems clear
to the writer that the Colorado Supreme Court in that case, when
confronted with an issue parallel to the one in the instant case,
handed down a decision which was consistent with the Massachusetts Rule, and in conflict with the English Rule, for it held
in substance that all of the net income earned during the period
of administration belonged to the life beneficiaries of the testamentary trust. The Court's exact statement is found on page
507 of 80 Colorado, and reads as follows:
Of course, the gross income earned during the period of administration could not properly be distributed
to the life beneficiaries. It was only the net income that
they were entitled to. Certain deductions must be made
from the gross income, like taxes on improved property,
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insurance, heat and light, ordinary repairs and maintenance and other like matters enumerated in plaintiff's
brief. The amount of the net income resulting, after the
the deduction of costs of earning the money collected during the period executorship, is the sum of $15,594.60.
This net income was earned by the executors during administration and up to the time they distributed the trust
estate to themselves as trustees. The decree of the court
in this particular was wrong and it is necessarily so as
the result of our conclusion upon the time when the income begins to run. This net income belongs to the life
beneficiaries and should be paid over to them. * * *
Those who argue for the English Rule contend that it is the
logical rule because a testator, when he speaks of "the net income
from the trust," means just that and not also the income from
those assets which never reach the trust. They contend that the
Massachusetts Rule creates a windfall for the life beneficiaries
which testators do not contemplate. They believe that it is better
and more in accord with the intent of most testators that the
"additional income" be added to the corpus so as to make more
certain the existence of an adequate trust fund for the entire
life of the beneficiaries.
On the other hand the proponents of the Massachusetts
Rule
point out that the English Rule has been severely criticized because of the many difficulties of accounting inherent in its application; that the Massachusetts Rule offers a clear and simple rule
upon which a testator may rely, if he so desires, or from which
he may depart if he so writes his will; that the Massachusetts Rule
has been approved by experience as more reasonable and practical than the English Rule; and that it is in accord with the
general rule in practically all jurisdictions, including Colorado,
that in all doubtful cases the interests of the life tenants are to
be preferred to the interests of the remaindermen. They emphasize that the Massachusetts Rule, and not the English Rule, best
provides for carrying out the testator's intent by providing for
the payment of the income in question to the life beneficiaries,
who are normally the first object of his concern, rather than
accumulating and capitalizing it for more distant remaindermen.
Whether the Colorado Supreme Court in Mulcahy v. Johnson,
supra, intended to adopt for Colorado the Massachusetts Rule and
discard its opposite, the English Rule, may continue to be the
subject of some debate. However, since the decision in the subject estate on December 29, 1952, it seems clear that the County
Court of Denver intends to follow the Massachusetts Rule pending any final determination by the Colorado Supreme Court.
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TAXATION PROBLEMS RELATING TO PATENTS
AND OTHER INTANGIBLE INDUSTRIAL
PROPERTY
ROBERT G. BONHAM
of the Denver Bar

On the Patent Office building in Washington appears the inscription "The Patent System Added the Fuel of Interest to the
Fire of Genius." This famous quotation by Abraham Lincoln has
now been modified by a damper to the fire in the form of the
Internal Revenue Code. Ever since 1913, the difficulties presented
to inventors and patent holders, as well as other taxpayers, have
been increasing. I shall not attempt in this paper to explore all
the ramifications present in this damper, but shall try to point
out some of the major problems confronting the individual fortunate enough to be granted a patent by our Government.
When a patent is finally issued'by the Patent Office, the holder
of this official document is mainly concerned with attempting to
augment his depleted coffers by the sale, assignment or license of
the rights granted by the patent. It is very important at this
stage of the game to determine the classification of the inventor.
Is he a professional inventor who uses his inventive capacity to
provide a livelihood? Or is he an individual who has merely been
struck by the so-called "flash of genius" and has perfected his
once-in-a-lifetime invention? We can go somewhat further and
possibly allow this latter individual to secure several occasional
patents, but he must not be permitted to lose his amateur standing.
This first possibility existing for the inventor is the outright
sale of all rights granted by the patent. Although it is difficult
to determine the future value of a patent as long as the possibility
exists that it may sometime be brought to the attention of the
Supreme Court, nevertheless, we will assume that a value has
been established, and a willing buyer has been contacted and
subdued.
For our amateur inventor, no great problem exists in the
sale of his rights. He is mainly interested in establishing the
transaction as a long-term capital gain under Section 117 of the
Internal Revenue Code, and to this end, assistance has been granted
by the courts. If the necessary holding period of 6 months has
been complied with, the courts have permitted the amateur inventor to qualify the transaction as a long-term capital gain.' In
determining the period of 6 months, a starting date for the holding period is permitted as being the time of reduction to practice
of the invention,2 and not as of the date of issuance of the patent.
'Maurice Bacon Cooke et ux, 4 TCM 204; James H. Adamson, 5 TCM 1071;
Edward C. Myers, 6 TC 258; William M. Kelly, 6 TCM 646; John W. Hogg et al,
3 TCM 211; Hoffenbert v. Briggs, 84 USPQ 36.

"Diescher v. Comm. Int. Rev., 36 BTA 732.
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Our professional inventor is not in such a fortunate position
as the amateur inventor. This individual who spends all, or the
majority of his time, in the obtaining of patents is faced with
different problems. The court ruled in the case of Harold Avery :
that the sale of patents by the professional inventor resulted in
ordinary income and not a capital gain. In this case, Avery had
procured 12 patents during a 17 year period, and had sold 3 of
these patents and licensed 3 others. Although Avery had originally started his patent activities as a hobby on his spare time,
the court said:
"What may have been a hobby originally became a
trade or business when he held the patents for sale or
license to others for profit."
The Bureau of Internal Revenue has stressed this decision
in later cases, but it appears that facts will have to be present to
establish that the patents are held by an individual for sale as
part of his ordinary business transactions in order to have the
doctrine of the Avery case invoked.
In a very interesting article by Mr. Jay 0. Kramer 4 concerning the sale of patents by professional inventors, the suggestion
is made that a professional inventor should retain title to his less
profitable inventions by issuing licenses, and report the royalties
received as ordinary income. The inventor is then in a position
to sell a more valuable patent and qualify such sale as a capital
gain.
If the professional inventor is unable to avoid the ruling that
the income received from the sale of his patent constitutes ordinary income, then we must attempt to find some other means to
assist this inventor. Under Section 107(b), the professional inventor is allowed to spread the income received over a period of
3 years provided he has worked on the invention for at least 3
years, and so long as certain provisions are complied with.
The professional inventor can also take advantage of the provisions of Section 44 of the Internal Revenue Code regarding
installment sales. Here the sale involves a fixed pre-determined
price with an installment payment made each year. This allows
the income to be spread over a number of years with a resulting
tax gain.
Another method of securing relief for the professional inventor is through an exchange of the patent to a corporation for
stock. This method is pointed out in an address given by Mr.
Gustave Simons 5 to the New York Patent Law Association. Here,
the exchange is a tax-free transaction, and when the stock is
eventually sold, the resulting income is a capital gain.
Before leaving the subject of the sale of a patent, let us look
' 47 BTA 538
Journal of the Patent Office Society 51.
'Tax Law of Research and Patents, 31 JPOS 574.
4 31
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for a moment at the decision in the Myers 6 case. Here, the inventor granted an exclusive license to use, manufacture and sell
the invention. Payments were designated as royalties and were
to be paid annually. The licensor reserved the right to cancel the
license in the event that the royalties failed to reach a specified
yearly amount. The court held that the agreement was a sale
even though the option was present, and the inventor allowed to
treat the income as a long-term capital gain.
The Bureau of Internal Revenue does not acquiesce in this
decision and issued a statement 7 setting forth the policy of the
Bureau. Under this policy the Bureau would treat as ordinary
income all amounts received by the inventor or owner of the patent
under an assignment or a license providing for payments to be
made, (1) in amounts measured by a fixed percentage of the selling price of the article manufactured and sold, (2) in amounts
based by any other method upon production, sale or use, or, (3)
in amounts payable periodically over the period in which the
assignee or licensee uses the patent.
In spite of the statement, the tax court has followed the
Myers case and ignored the policy established in holding later
cases contra to the policy.8 In connection with the Myers case,
a study should be made of the Waterman v. Mackenzie 9 case which
involves a similar type agreement, but the right to "use" the invention was omitted.
Assuming that we have established that a sale actually exists
for both our amateur and professional inventor, we are now faced
with the problem of establishing a value for the capital asset in
order that the tax can be determined.
Under Regulation 111 of the Internal Revenue Code we find
that the cost of developing patents should be capitalized. 10 This
provision relating to Research Expense will be discussed in greater
detail later in this paper. We also find under this regulation that
the following costs, when actually paid, are allowable in determining the sum to be capitalized when a patent is obtained from
the United States Government:
1. Various Government fees.
2. Development or experimental expenses.
3. Experimental models.
4. Costs of drawings.
5. Attorney's fees and similar expenses.
The provision in the regulation " provides as follows:
6 Edward C. Myers, supra.

'Mimeo. 6490-1950-1CB9.
1H. W. Taylor, 16 TC 376 (non-acq.).
9138 US 252.
10Gilliam
Mfg. Co., 1 BTA 967; Goodell-Pratt Co., 3 BTA 30; Beaumont Co.
v. Comm. Int. Rev., 3 BTA 822; Dempster Mill Mfg. Co.. v. Burnet, 46 Fed. (2d)
604.
"Regulation 111, Sec. 29.23 (1) 8.
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"If a taxpayer has incurred expenditures in his business for designs, drawings, patterns, models, or work of
an experimental nature calculated to result in improvement of his facilities or his product, and if the period
of usefulness of any such asset may be estimated from
experience with reasonable accuracy, it may be the subject of depreciation allowances spread over the estimated
period of usefulness."
Since a patent runs for a period of 17 years from the date
of issuance, depreciation is allowable over the period of life. However, the basis for computation must be established sufficiently
to allow the depreciation.'
To digress for a moment, we also
find that the regulations 13 allow an obsolescent deduction for patents in the amount of the depreciated cost of that part of the
patent proved to be obsolete.' 4 This permits the unamortized value
to be charged off completely or in part to expense in any year
where circumstances create a decline in value or complete loss
of value to the patent owner. Besides obsolescence, court decisions
holding the patent invalid, court injunctions against use of the
patent, transfer of patent to an educational or other institution
in good faith will allow the unamortized value to be expensed.
Returning now to our inventor, we find from the foregoing
information that he would be required to capitalize the patent
2ost, determine the unamortized value, relate this value to the
sale price, and then determine his tax on a long-term capital
gain basis.
The majority of the preceding discussion has been related
to the sale of a patent. Now the tax problems for other methods
of handling the patent should be considered.
The most general method used by patent owners is the license
agreement. By the use of a license agreement, the patent owner
can retain control over his invention and also over improvements
to his invention. As a general rule, royalties received from patent
licenses are taxable as ordinary income under Section 22(a) of
the Internal Revenue Code. 15 From the standpoint of the licensee
of the patent, the royalties are treated as a deductible business
expense.' 6
By retaining control of the patent through the use of a license
agreement, the patent owner also is subjected to the possibility
of litigation. This usually involves actions against the infringers
of the patent, which may run several years before final settlement.
If the patent holder is successful in such actions and recovers
damages from the infringer, such payments are usually regarded
as deferred income and treated as ordinary income for tax pur-

"Niagara

Searchlight Co., 10 BTA 922.

" Regulation 103, Sec. 19.23(1) 7.
"Hazeltine Corp. v. Comm. Int. Rev., 89 Fed. (2d) 513.
,5 Ernest G. Hoffman, 8 BTA 1272.
" Regulation 111, Section 29.23 (a) 1.
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poses. As suggested by Mr. Charles M. Hogan 17 in an excellent
article concerning the Impact of Federal Income Taxation on
Patent Law and Practice, it is advantageous to join a count for
unfair competition and prove damage to the assets of the business.
If such damages can be established, then the money paid as compensation for the injury to the asset is treated as ordinary income only to the extent that it exceeds the amount of the loss to
the assets of the business.
When damages are finally recovered, the amounts should be
included in the income tax return in the year in which they are
received. Although the actual damages may have occurred several years before, it is not until the actual final accounting is
made that the exact amount is determined.
The actual cost of the litigation against the infringers of
the patent is a deductible expense provided the litigation does not
perfect the title or prolong the life of the patent. The costs, which
include court costs and counsel fees, can be deducted in the year
incurred or at the close of the litigation proceedings. The losing
party in such litigation is allowed to deduct the amount paid on
the judgment.' 8 In contrast to the allowance of these legal fees
as deductible expenses, we find the amounts expended for legal
services in connection with the prosecution of patent applications
and interference proceedings in the Patent Office are treated as
capital expenditures and not deductible expenses. 19 This is true
even though some of the patent applications did not become issued patents.
The preceding discussion has mainly been directed to the field
of patents. Although many of the provisions are the same for
copyrights and trade-marks, there are certain differences in the
handling of this type of intangible property that should be pointed
out.
Copyrights, which are granted for a period of 28 years with
the right to renew for an additional 28 year period, are subject
to depreciation, and when sold; the gain or loss arising therefrom
is computed by taking the difference between the selling price and
the cost as established with proper adjustment for depreciation.
To a person in the profession of writing books or creating
other artistic works, his income from the sale of the products of
his work is taxed as ordinary income, and it matters not whether
the income is in the form of royalties or proceeds from outright
sale.
Two types of capital expenditures are found in the publication and sale of copyrighted books. In one case, the cost of producing and copyrighting the text may be returned to the holder
through an annual allowance for depreciation, or if sold, the
adjusted basis may be deducted from the sum received in deter33 JPOS 531.
"Becker Bros. v. U. S., 7 Fed. (2d) 3.
19Hazeltine Corp. v, Comm. Int. Rev., supra.
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mining the gain or loss from the sale. In the second case, where
the author publishes a book, pays all publication costs and
handles the sale of the books himself, he is allowed to allocate a
proportionate share of the cost of each book and deduct this amount
from the selling price in determining the amount to be reported
as a profit and taxed as ordinary income.
Payments for limited rights in copyrighted works such as
motion picture rights are treated as payments in the nature of
royalties and taxed as ordinary income. The fact that the payments are made in lump sums does not change their status as
royalties.2 0 Motion picture rights are classified as property held
primarily for sale rather than property used in a business, and
therefore the sale of such rights results in ordinary income.
Passing to the field of trade-marks, we find we are dealing
with property that has an indefinite duration. A trade-mark is
granted by the Patent Office for a period of 20 years, and a renewal can be secured for each ensuing 20 year period. The courts
have held that the inherent quality of trade-marks is such that
they are not subject to exhaustion. 2 ' Other types of intangible
property such as Goodwill, trade names, newspaper subscription
lists and formulas are also not subject to a depreciation or obsolescent allowance because of the indefinite duration of their effective usefulness. It is only when the law makes the business worthless that this type of intangible property can properly be deducted
as a loss.
The legal expenses incurred in prosecuting infringers of trademarks are capital expenditures which are added to the cost of the
trade-mark and are not deductible expenses. *A recent case 22 held
that attorney's fees are not an allowable deduction where the fees
were incurred in litigation to defend or perfect the title to a property right in a trade name. An amount paid to a company for
permission to use a registered trade-mark is a capital expenditure and not an expense.
The problem of Research and Development Expense was
briefly mentioned before and it was pointed out that the general
rule is that these types of expenses should be capitalized. When
they are capitalized they are amortized over the useful life of the
project or over the 17 year life of the patent. If the project is
abandoned, or if the patent becomes worthless, these expenses
may then be written off in the year that such abandonment or
obsolescence occurs. An excellent paper, previously mentioned,
concerning
this general problem was given by Mr. Gustave Si23
mons.

An important case2 4

pertaining to the problem of handling

:oComm. Int. Rev. v. P. G. Woodehouse, 337 U. S. 369.
-Norwich Pharmacal Co., 30 B.T.A. 326.
"Food Fair of Virginia, Inc. v. Comm. Int. Rev., 85 USPQ 518.
Supra.
'Hart-Bartlett-Sturtevant Grain Co., 12 T.C. 101.
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research expenses concerned contributions made to a Research
Institute for vital research. The court held that these contributions were not deductible as current expenses and the following
appeared in the opinion:
It has been consistently held that expenses incurred
in the experimentation and development of patents, formulas, and processes, are capital expenditures . . .
It is not determinative of the issue here that nothing of a capital nature was developed during the taxable
year in question or that the particular line of research
which the Institute was following during that year subsequently proved fruitless. It is clearly the very nature of
an experimental project that many lines of approach
must be tried and many abandoned before results are
obtained.
Manifestly, the initial unsuccessful experiments as
well as the final successful ones would have entered into
the cost of any capital asset that had been developed.
There was no occasion for saying at the close of the taxable year that no capital asset would be developed and
for isolating the portion of the project sum expended by
the Institute up until that time and deducting it as a
business expense of petitioner. Clearly the project sum,
which had been paid in toto by petitioner to the Midwest
Research Institute shortly after the contract was executed, should be treated as a unit, like the project. As
of the end of the taxable year on April 30, 1946, only
slightly more than one-third of that project sum had been
expended and only slightly more than one-fourth of the
project time had elapsed. Only when the complete project had resulted in failure and there had been a definite
abandonment or termination would the expenditures have
been deducted, and then as a loss.
This case would seem to indicate that all research costs must
be capitalized and that it is impossible to claim current expense
deductions for these costs. This, however, is not the case, as the
Bureau of Internal Revenue allows such expenses to be deducted
as current expenses. The taxpayer, in order to qualify for such
treatment, must follow a consistent practice in the handling of
these expenses, and the amount spent in research must be approximately the same each year. This, of course, places a burden
on new companies and also on small companies where the research
expenses will vary widely from year to year.
The present policy of the Bureau of Internal Revenue is
excellently stated in an article written by Mr. J. Keith Butters. -.
"By and large, the Bureau of Internal Revenue in its
actual treatment of the handling of research and develop= Taxation and New Product Dcvelopment, Harvard Business Review, Summer 1945, p. 451.
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ment expenditures has been much more liberal than the
Treasury regulations would indicate and has generally
permitted such expenditures to be deducted as current
charges against net income.
The policy of the Bureau appears to be roughly as
follows: If a firm spends approximately the same amount
on research and development work year after year and
consistently claims these expenditures as deductions from
current income, it seldom has substantial amounts of its
claims disallowed. On the other hand, if the amounts spent
on research and development fluctuate widely from year
to year and if the taxpayer does not follow a consistent
accounting practice, the Bureau quite naturally tends to
be more critical.
This policy sometimes results in a less favorable
treatment for small, and also for new, companies than
for large, established companies. The research expenditures of a small company operating in a field where research is important are likely to fluctuate more widely
than those of a large company, and hence to be questioned
more closely by the Bureau. A new company will frequently establish a precedent of capitalizing research and
development expenditures in its early years in order to
avoid reporting heavy losses and to make the best possible showing on its balance sheets. Such a precedent may
later prove very damaging, but once it is established great
difficulty is likely to be encountered in reversing it.
From the above, it can be seen that the Bureau is still following in practice the old provisions of the regulation which
allowed the taxpayer to elect either a deduction for the research
expenses in the year incurred or to treat the expenses as a capital
asset. It must be recognized that a serious challenge from the
Bureau to the present operating practice of a concern will probably result in the expenditures being capitalized.
In closing, it can be readily seen that the taxation problems
involving intangible property are many and varied. It is only
through the close cooperation of the legal profession and the accounting profession that the proper solutions may be uncovered,
and the interests of the owner of such property be fully protected.
ON THE PRUDENT MAN RULE
In the Matter of the Estate of John Joseph Jacobs, No. 60051,
Judge Brofman ruled that, in the absence of language in the will
to the contrary, a fiduciary may make investments under the
"prudent man rule," Chap. 297, L. 1951 (Section 126, Chap. 176,
'35 C.S.A.), notwithstanding the fact that the preparation of the
instrument and the death of the testator were prior to the enactment date of the legislation adopting the "prudent man rule."
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THE COMMON-LAW COPYRIGHT AND
ITS LIMITATIONS
LYSLE R. DIRRIM
of the Denver Bar

Copyright is the law's recognition of an author's rights in
the product of his own artistic creation. This intangible right can
be secured by statute or by the application of the common law.
At the offset, it should be pointed out that this article is only interested in the latter, the common-law rights of the author.
The common-law theory of copyright takes the author as the
principle object of protection. This theory is so popular in Europe
that the term "droits des auteurs" (rights of authors), is used
instead of copyright.1 In the United States this common-law right
is usually referred to as the right of first publication. The justification for this common-law right lies in the theory that the
claim of the artistic creator to an unpublished manuscript is based
upon the production and labor of the author and his right to share
in the profits resulting from dissemination of his labor.-'
The Court stated in King Features v. Fleischer:3
"To what is the artist or author entitled as his
conception and what if such original conception has been
appropriated? He is entitled to any lawful use of his
property whereby he may get a profit out of it. Falk v.
Donaldson, 57 Fed. 30. It is the commercial value of
his property that he is protected for, to encourage the
arts by securing to him the monopoly in the sale of the
objec.t of the attraction. Gamber v. Ball. CB (NS) 306."
This right of first Dublication was recognized and protected
by Congress when, under proper constitutional power, 4 they enacted the Copyright Statute which states in Section 2 :5
"Nothing in this title shall be construed to annul
or limit the right of the author or proprietor of an unpublished work, at common law or in equity, to prevent
the copying, publication, or use of such unpublished work
without his consent and to obtain damages therefor."
The existence of the common-law right is of great importance
to the author of literary property. It gives him a property right
in his creation that accrues automatically by the very act of writing. The form of literary property which is covered by the common law is the right to control the public use of a manuscript up
to the moment when it is first generally published. It is the sole
right of the author to decide by whom, when, where, and in what
form, his manuscript shall be published for the first time, to
Alfred M., Shafter Musical Copyright (1939), p. 119.
-Pushman v. New York, 39 N. E. 2d 249 (1942).
1229 F. 533 (Copyright Office Bulletin No. 20,360) (1925).
1U. S. Const., Art. 1, Sec. 8.
'Title 17, U. S. C., Sec. 2.
IShafter,
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restrain others from publishing it without his permission and
from using it without his authority, and to recover damages from
those publishing it without his permission or using it without his
authority. The idea of the common-law property right should be
kept distinguished from the other form of literary property right
which is statutory and gives the right of monopoly after the first
general publication.;
This property right has been defined as an intangible, absolute right which is purely incorporeal and is attendant with considerations entirely different from any involved in other rights.Mr. Justice Holmes said of copyright property:S
"The notion of property starts, I suppose, from confirmed possession of a tangible object and consists in
the right to exclude others from interference with the
more or less free doing with it as one wills. But in copy.
right property has reached a more abstract expression.
The right to exclude is not directed to an object in possession or owned, but is in vacuo so to speak. It restrains
the spontaneity of men where but for it there would be
nothing of any kind to hinder their doing as they saw fit.
It is a prohibition of conduct remote from the persons
or tangibles of the party having the right. It may be
infringed a thousand miles from the owner and without
his ever becoming aware of the wrong. It is a right
which could not be recognized or endured for more than
a limited time, and thereafter, I may remark in passing,
it is one which can hardly be conceived except as a
product of statute, as the authorities now agree.
In the above case Mr. Justice Holmes was speaking of the
statutory concept of copyright property. The common-law right.
on the other hand, is not the product of statute and, as we shall
see, may endure indefinitely. However, the common-law right
can also be said to be in vacuo, just as the statutory copyright,
and may achieve all the things Mr. Justice Holmes said could not
have been achieved but for statute.
The Courts have recognized a difference between the property of a creator in his idea and that of his manuscript, paper and
ink. 9 In Stephens v. Cady, the Court stated :10
"But since the literary property in a manuscript is
and always has been separate from the actual manuscript itself, that is, something in the nature of a chose
in action, the right to publish may not be inferred from
the mere possession of the manuscript. . . . As above
stated, literary rights have always been held to be separaGShaw, Ralph R., Literary Property in the Uvited States (1950), pp. 12, 26;
Golding v. RKO, 193 P. 2d 153 (1948).
,34 Am. Jur. 402 (1941).
8white-Smith v. Appolo, 209 U. S. 19 (1908)..
'Brunner v. Stix, 181 S. W. 2d 643 (1944).
155

U. S. 528, 14 L. Ed. 528 (1852).
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able from the manuscript itself. . . . There is no question but that it is a different and independent right from
the usual right of ownership of an article of personal
property."
The Court, in Local Trademarks v. Price," said that a copyright was in the nature of a privilege or franchise in distinguishing between the idea of a personal property right and that of a
literary property right and stated:
"A copyright is an intangible, incorporeal right in
the nature of a privilege or franchise and is independent
of any material substance such as the manuscript or
plate used for printing. It is entirely disconnected therefrom.
"The principle is clearly stated by the Court in
Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co., C.C., 142 F.
827, 830, thus: 'The author of a painting, when it is
finished, before publication, owns a material piece of
property, consisting of the canvas and the paint upon it.
He also owns an incorporeal right connected with it;
that is, the right to make a copy of it. These two kinds
of property, although growing out of the same intellectual
production are in their nature essentially and inherently
distinct .. . ."
WHAT THE COMMON-LAW COPYRIGHT PROTECTS

Copyright, whether statutory or common law, protects only
the expression of an idea and is only concerned with its form of
presentation. It does not protect the idea itself or the facts contained therein. The Court pointed this out in Brunner v. Stix,
supra,r - in stating:
"There is a distinction between the property of a
creator in his idea and his property in the manuscript
setting forth his idea (property in a personal chattel),
as well as his right to prevent others from reproducing
his expressions of his ideas-the present day commonlaw right to make original publication and statutory authority to multiply copies for a limited time to the exclusion of others. Common law and statutory copyright
.*are monopolistic in nature. Generally speaking,
•.
one's common-law monopolistic right to publish a literary
work ceases upon publication and statutory copyright
continues the monopolistic right to multiply copies thereafter for a limited period. . . . Copyright protects the
expression of an idea. It does not protect the idea."
The basis to understanding literary property is the fact that
the only thing protected is a particular form of presentation.
And even that is not protected in the same degree that patents
protect inventions. To obtain a patent, an inventor must show
11170 F. 2d 715 (1948).
'= Id. at p. 3.
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sufficient novelty in execution of the method or mechanism which
he wishes to protect to support his claim of originality. Once
his patent is granted, anyone else who hits upon the same idea
and the same or a similar method of carrying out that idea will
be stopped, during the life of the prior patent, from making or
using or selling his invention.
None of this is true with respect to literary property. Literary property rights are granted without examination for novelty.
In copyright, if the same idea can be expressed in a plurality of
of copyrights may result
totally different manners, a plurality
13
and no infringement will exist.
It is obvious that if an author could have a monopoly on his
ideas and materials used in his creation and could prevent their
use by other authors, each copyright would narrow the field of
thought open for development and exploitation, and science, poetry,
narrative and dramatic fiction and other branches of literature
would be hindered by copyright instead of being promoted.
The purpose of copyright and how far its protection should
extend is shown by the Court's ruling in Holmes v. Hurst:14
"The object of copyright is to promote science and
the useful arts. If an author by originating a new arrangement and form of expression of certain ideas or
conceptions could withdraw these ideas or conceptions
from the stock of materials to be used by other authors,
each copyright would narrow the field of thought open
for development and exploitation; and science, poetry,
narrative, and dramatic fiction and other branches of
literature would be hindered by copyright instead of
being promoted. A poem consists of words, expressing
conceptions of words or lines of thought, but copyright
in the poem gives no monopoly in the separate words or
in the ideas, conceptions, or facts expressed or described
by the words. A copyright extends only to the arrangement of words. A copyright does not give a monopoly in
any incident in a play. Other authors have a right to
exploit the facts, experiences, field of thought, and general ideas, provided they do not substantially copy a concrete form in which the circumstances and ideas have
been developed, arranged and put into shape."
One of the advantages and attributes of common-law copyright is that it is perpetual as compared with statutory copyright,
which is limited to a 26 year term and renewable for an additional
26 years. The common-law copyright may last theoretically forever, the lifetime of the creator, his heirs, or whom he assigns or
otherwise transfers it to, although it may be lost at any time by
a general publication or abandonment. 15
1'Shaw, op cit. sitpro, note 6 at p. 2; Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F. 2d 691 (Copyright Office Bulletin 20, 201) (1926).
11174 U. S. 82; 19 Sup. Ct. 606 (1899).
"Willemberg, Philip, Literary Property (1937); Werckmeister v. American
Lithographic Co., 134 F. 323; 68 L. R. A. 591 (1904).
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TRANSFERABILITY OF COPYRIGHT

Although the common-law copyright has been said to be entirely different from that of any other property right, the creator
or owner of a common-law copyright may sell, transfer or assign
his property right or any portions thereof in the same manner
as he would any other property right. The sales may be absolute
or conditional and may be oral or written.
The property right may also be bequeathed by will or may
pass to the personal representative of the owner upon the death
of the owner. 16
LIMITATIONS OF THE COMMON-LAW COPYRIGHT

Although the common-law copyright gives protection to the
uninformed creator, perhaps when it is needed most, by the very
act of creating any writing, the common-law copyright has certain and sometimes disastrous limitations. Where the creator
may unknowingly acquire the protection of the common-law copyright he may unknowingly lose this protection.
THE EFFECT OF STATUTORY TO COMMON-LAW RIGHTS

It is a general rule that the common-law copyright and the
statutory copyright cannot co-exist in the same composition. The
acquisition of the statutory copyright destroys the common-law
accepted the statutory right
right, the author is deemed to have
17
in place of his common-law right. '
In Societe Des Films, Menchem v. Vitagraph Co. of America,
the Court stated:' s
"The author of an unpublished dramatic composition has a right of election to content himself with common-law copyright or to substitute therefor the right
afforded by copyright statute to exclusive representation
by complying with statutory provisions.
"A common-law and statutory copyright may not
exist concurrently but statutory copyright divests ownership of his common-law right."
GENERAL PUBLICATION

One of the most common ways to terminate a common-law
literary property right is by abandonment or dedication to the
public. A general publication is dedication to public use. Also,
one of the basic problems confronting common-law copyrights is
the question of publication and what constitutes publication in a
given situation.
General publication consists of selling, offering for sale, or
dedication to the public by general distribution one or more copies
of the work in question.' 9
Corpus Juris Secundum, p. 141 (1939).
17Tompkins v. Hallick, 133 Mass. 32 (1882); Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus, 210
U. S. 346 (1907).
8 251 F. 258, 163 C.C.A. 414.
"Wincan, Richard, How to Secure a Copyright (1950).
'618

Mar., 1953

DICTA

While some courts have held that intent is necessary before
the author is deemed to have dedicated to the public, other courts
have held that intent is immaterial.
In Holmes v. Hurst, supra,20 the United States Supreme Court
ruled:
"If an author permits his intellectual production to
be published either serially or collectively, his right to
a copyright is lost as effectually as the right of an in-.
ventor to a patent upon an invention which he deliberately abandons to the public, and this too irrespective
of his actual intention not to make such abandonment."
While it is not clear whether actual intent is needed on the
part of the author to constitute dedication to the public, probably
the better rule is that intent may be assumed by the author's acts.
This rule was followed in the Werckmeister case where the Court

said :21

"A general publication consists of such a disclosure,
communication, circulation, exhibition, or distribution of
the subject of copyright, tendered or given to one or
more members of the general public as implies an abandonment of the right of copyright or its dedication to
the public."
In a more recent interesting case 22 plaintiffs alleged the defendants unlawfully appropriated plans for a residential building
and the plans were common-law property of the plaintiff.
The facts showed that the plaintiff had previously built a
house in accordance with the plans in question and that the house
was held open to inspection by the public.
The Court held that holding a house open for public inspection was a publication of the plans and stated:
"The creator of a unique intellectual production, such
as a picture, a book, a play, a compilation of facts or
an architectural plan, has a property right in the thing
created. This property right attaches to the incorporeal
idea which has taken definite form in the mind of the
creator, as distinguished from the paper upon which it is
portrayed or the material of which it is physically composed. It is recognized at common law. No copyright
statute is required in order for the creator of a unique
intellectual product to protect such property from unauthorized invasion, appropriation or conversion. The
property right is based upon the established principle
that every man is entitled to the fruits of his own effort,
mental as well as physical.
"The property right above mentioned needs no statutory enactment for its protection so long as the creator,
20174 U. S. 85, 19 Sup. Ct. 606 (1899).
211d. at p. 6.
11Kurfiss v. Cowherd, 233 Mo. App. 397, 405 (1938).
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and therefore the owner of the product retains control
of it, or until he voluntarily dedicates it to all the world;
but if the owner releases it for general and unrestricted
publication he can no longer reap benefits from its use
except he may have it copyrighted under the statute. .. "
While the courts have not been definite as to what constitutes
a general publication, the main question seems to be whether there
was a publication to the members of the general public. In the
following cases the author was deemed to have publicated to the
general public: by delivery of copies to the Secretary of State, by
a gratuitous presentation of a book to public libraries, appearance
of a pamphlet in a public hotel, and by filing of the author's work
in a public office.
PARTIAL PUBLICATION

Probably, part of the courts' difficulty in determining what is
publication or dedication to the public is the distinction they place
on general and limited publication. While we have seen that a general publication to the public will terminate an author's commonlaw copyright, the courts have held that a limited publication is
entitled to the common law protection.
In Berry v. Hoffman, 24 the Court stated:
"Every communication of knowledge of the contents
of a literary composition is in a sense a publication. However, the cases dealing with copyright early recognized a
distinction between a general publication and a limited
publication. When the communication is to a select number upon conditions express or implied, that it is not intended to be thereafter common property, the publication is then said to be limited.
"The test is whether there is or is not such a surrender as permits the absolute and unqalified enjoyment of
the subject matter by the public or the members thereof
to whom it may be committed."
It appears that when a literary work is published or exhibited
for a limited and particular purpose or to a limited number of persons it does not become public property and the author retains
ownership of the work.
The courts have held that the delivering of lectures before
audiences, exhibitions of paintings in private galleries, and the
private circulation of manuscripts is only partial
or limited pub25
lication and not abandonment to the public use.
It therefore appears that by careful restrictions an author
may publicate and keep his common-law protection, but where the
line is to be drawn between a limited and general publication ap125 Pa. Superior Ct. 261, 189 Atl. 516 (1937).
Nutt v. National Institute, Inc., 31 Fed. 2d 236 (Copyright Office Bulletin
No. 20, 1935) p. 516; Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co., 134 F. 323;
68 L. R. A. 591 (1904).
24
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parently depends on a given situation and a given court with no set
rules.
PERFORMANCE

The courts have further confused the question of what is
publication by drawing a further distinction between publication
and performance. The courts have ruled that to reproduce copies
of a play to the public is publication but if you only perform
your
2
works or play before the public you have not published.
In Brown v. Ferris27 the Court stated the general rule as to
performance by stating:
"The law on the question seems well settled that the
publication of a literary work by an author is dedication
of same to the public; it becomes public property unless,
of course, he reserves such rights as the law allows him
by copyright. There is, however, a different rule governing
literary production. . . . In McCarthy & Fisher v. While,
259 Fed. 364, Judge A. Hand says, 'The defendants insist
that the presentation of the song by Holly in vaudeville
prior to the date of the copyright was a complete dedication to the public. It is, however, well settled that a
public performance of a dramatic or musical composition
is not an abandonment of the composition to the public.' "
It therefore appears from the foregoing cases that by performing his works an author may make commercial use of his
work and make it known to the public without terminating his
common-law copyright.
LACHES

Although it may be called publication or abandonment, it
appears that an author may lose his common-law copyright on
the theory of laches or negligence.
Laches occurs when the author or composer is aware that his
works are being published or used by someone else, and remains
inactive and does nothing to assert his rights for an extended
period of time.
Some of the cases have endeavored to include this type of
situation under the heading of publication and go on the theory
that the author, by his unprotesting silence, has impliedly acquiesed on consent to the publication by others of his creation.
But the more logical course would be to declare the author,
by virtue of his neglect, or laches, as having forfeited his rights,
and as having barred himself from suing for relief ordinarily had
under his common-law
protection. His right remains but his
28
remedy is gone.
21Thompkins v. Halleck, supra, at p. 7.
17

204 N. Y. Supp. 190 (1924)

(Copyright Office Bulletin No. 20, 94)

28Shafter, op. cit. supra, note 1 at p. 1.

(1935).
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BURDEN OF PROOF

Although, theoretically, the creator of literary property has
a property right by the very act of creating, the problems of proof
can be very great.
We have many cases in American history where the inspired
creator has suddenly jotted down his creation on scratch paper
or used any materials that were in his reach. If later, the question
of ownership or the time of the creation were to be questioned the
creator may have a next to impossible task as to the proof. The
difficulty of proof was evidenced by the George case 29 where the
author of "The Wreck of the Old 97" was finally able to prove his
ownership of this song against the R. C. A. Victor Company by
the testimony of his neighbors who had heard him and his daughter
play it years before it was recorded, and also, by an old copy
unearthed in a dusty trunk.
The courts have clearly placed the burden of proof on the
party who seeks to enforce a common-law copyright. In the
George case 30 the Court stated:
"When the supposed party sues for a violation of a
copyright the existence of those facts of originality, of
intellectual production, of thought, and conception on the
part of the author should be proved."
There are some authors and vaudeville organizations which
provide for the deposit and registration of songs, scripts and other
matters of a similar nature. As far as local or state governmental
agencies are concerned, California is the only
31 known state providing for state registration of manuscripts.
It would appear that the common-law copyright can only
reach its full purpose and be of the greatest benefit to the owners of unpublished works by the use of State or Federal agencies
that would provide for the registration of these unpublished works.
This would give the owner of the unpublished works a means of
proving ownership and provide for the fullest protection under
our common-law copyright rights.

IVictor

Talking Machine Co. v. George, 69 Fed. 2d 871 (1934)
Office Bulletin No. 20, p. 754).

(Copyright

Ibid.

Shafter, Alfred M., Shafter Musical Copyright (1939), p. 112.
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